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Abstract
How unequal were the commons preceding their enclosure in the 18th-19th cen-
turies? This paper uses data from the parliamentary enclosure acts to estimate in-
equality. Inclusive of the landless, I find gini coefficients ranged from 0.65-0.82 while
the landless typically composed 40-50% of the population. Despite these regions be-
ing the most equal within England at the time, their inequality was similar to typical
villages in contemporary Italy and less equal than those in Germany or Japan. This
confirms that the commons, most of which were enclosed by the 19th century, were
already highly unequal and this paved the way to enclosure.
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Estimating wealth inequality in pre-industrial rural England is complicated by the exis-
tence of “common rights” over land. Common rights were “old-established rights exercised
by the occupiers of farm lands and cottages [that] varied considerably in nature and extent
from place to place” (Mingay, 2014). Such rights were concentrated in commons, which
included open-fields, wastes, meadows, and pastures. Although these were not landowner-
ship rights, an economist will nevertheless consider this a form of wealth as these rights
generated (implicit) incomes. Such incomes were not necessarily trivial either. One example
comes from the copyholder (or tenant) who had inheritable and legally enforceable use rights
over land. In one sample from 1694-1704, Gayton (2013) shows that copyholders were on
average sub-letting lands at rates of 12.6 times the land rent rate paid to the owner. This
suggests most of the land’s share of income went to the copyholder instead of the landowner.
Therefore, simply looking at landownership can potentially seriously overestimate wealth
inequality.
This paper uses evidence from the allotments in 510 parliamentary enclosure acts to
measure inequality in rural landownership while accounting for such rights. This is possible
because enclosure was enacted by re-distributing lands with common right and turning them
into privately owned lands. This was done in accordance with the value of legal rights within
the commons. Although some non-legal right such as the rights of custom were often ignored,
meaning we fail to account for all rights, these generally had little value (Clark, 1998). By
measuring the inequality of the redistributed lands, I estimate inequality in each of these
parishes among rights owners. I find that Gini coefficients generally ranged from 0.5-0.6.
However, England also had many landless households at the time. In order to account for
the landless, I use supplementary data of adult male population within these parishes to
estimate the number of adult men who were landless. They suggest the share landless were
typically 40-50% within commons. The resulting gini coefficient inclusive of the landless
range from 0.65-0.82.
Since commons were generally of lower value and decreasing proportion of lands, perhaps
20% of land by 1750 (see figure 1), these estimates are not a nationally representative sample
(Clark, 1998; Clark and Clark, 2001). Instead, this should be considered a lower bound
estimate of rural wealth inequality. This can be inferred from the process of enclosure. Most
lands were enclosed prior to parliamentary enclosure via private enclosures which required
unanimous consent among all holders of rights (McCloskey, 2015). A successful private
enclosure therefore required the absence of holdouts and favored relatively unequal areas
with few rights holders. In contrast, the remaining lands that were enclosed by parliamentary
enclosure required only a large majority, usually people owning 80% of the lands, meaning
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Figure 1: Estimates of the Share of Commons in England
Source: Clark and Clark (2001)
of rural England.
How do the findings from the commons, the relatively equal parts of England, compare to
other contemporary societies. I find that the English commons in the 18th-19th century were
similar in inequality to Italy but much more unequal than Germany or Japan (Alfani, 2015;
Alfani and Di Tullio, 2019; Kumon, 2019; Alfani et al., 2020). This has two implications.
First, the commons were not particularly equal from an international perspective. Second,
this suggests England as a whole was more unequal than pre-industrial Italy. These are
important findings because past studies had measures of wealth inequality, such as share
landless, which were not comparable across societies. Therefore, we were unsure about
where England should be placed in terms of wealth inequality.
I also compare land distributions in the commons across other wealth inequality measures
across time. I first estimate inequality for medieval England using data from (Kanzaka, 2002).
I find the gini coefficient for landholdings (with land rights similar to the commons) inclusive
of the landless was 0.78. After adjusting for differences in the data, this suggests medieval
England was certainly more unequal than England in the 19th century. However, England
was far more unequal in 1900 until the decline after the First World War (Alvaredo et al.,
2018).
Finally, the data also speaks to the process of enclosure. The evidence suggests only 30-
45% of the population were required to begin the process of enclosure within these regions.
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The minority were enclosing these commons, potentially against the will of the majority. I
also estimate the trend in inequality of commons that got enclosed over time. As I do not
observe the same parish across time, this says little about inequality trends. Instead, this
shows whether enclosure was being initiated in more equal parishes. I find a slightly negative
trend in inequality excluding the landless which is primarily driven from observations in
Yorkshire. Therefore, there may have been some changes in the willingness of people to
accept enclosure in some regions.
The findings from this paper have implications on rural inequality in England. Marx
(1867) argued that enclosures created a class of workers reliant on wage incomes. Implicitly,
this assumed a large number of people had valuable rights within the commons. In contrast,
others like Chambers (1953) had argued that the proletariat already existed by the 18th
century. More recent statistical evidence from Shaw-Taylor (2005) has demonstrated that
there were 5.4 male agricultural workers to every farmer by 1851. This proletariat workforce
may have already been in place in regions such as the south east by 1700 (Shaw-Taylor,
2012) or more generally for England as a whole (Lindert, 1987). Thus, the number of wage
laborers were high preceding enclosure. Other literature has further shown that only limited
people had access to common rights (Shaw-Taylor, 2001). I contribute to this literature in
two ways. First, I show that common rights themselves were highly unequally distributed
relative to wealth distributions in other societies. Thus, even the commons should not be
regarded as the final bastions of equality. Second, wealth inequality estimates have tended
to rely on measuring the share of landless among adult men. I extend this by measuring a
feasible lower bound of the gini coefficient of land rights distributions.
Finally, it is important to distinguish this paper with a related literature on the conse-
quences of enclosure. This paper only looks at wealth distribution preceding enclosure and
has nothing to say about whether enclosure increased inequality. Land distributions may
have changed as a consequence of enclosure due to the need to drain and fence (and there-
fore enclose) the lands which in itself was disincentivizing enclosure (Clark, 1998). Further,
there were the costs of paying the commissioners of enclosure. As the costs of fencing were
disproportionately higher for smaller plots, this may have led to increased inequality after
the enclosure (Neeson, 1996) resulting in the loss of incomes (Humphries, 1990). However,
even if there was an increase in inequality, this was from an already high level of inequality.
Data
I use secondary data from 510 parliamentary enclosure acts from Buckinghamshire, War-
wichshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Cumbria, Westmorland, and Yorkshire (Martin,
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1967; Yelling, 1977; Turner, 1980; Crowther, 1983; Searle, 1993; Brown, 1995; Whyte, 2006).
Enclosure involved the consolidation of scattered lands and the end to the rights of com-
mon through compensation via privately held lands. When sufficient people agreed, usually
amounting to people owning 80% of the lands, an enclosure through a parliamentary act
could occur. A commission, often involving professional land surveyors and valuers, was
then hired to split the lands among the rights holders. The commission was often but not
always composed of three people, each being appointed by the lord of the manor, the tithe
owner, and the majority of the remaining landowners by value (Turner, 1977). The com-
misioners re-distributed common lands into privately owned land according to the value of
the legal rights.1 The redistribution often did not account for rights of custom (Humphries,
1990) although the value of such rights were small (Clark, 1998). The records resulting from
this process include the acreage awarded to each person that allows us to construct inequality
estimates at the point at which the act was passed.
Using the data, I calculate the gini coefficient, both inclusive and exclusive of the landless,
and the share landless. I use these inequality measures as they are the most commonly used
in the literature allowing for comparison. In addition, the share landless is an important
measure for assessing the degree of “proletariazation” within the most equal parts of the
countryside. In addition, I calculate the share of land right holders who needed to agree to
begin parliamentary enclosure. I assume people holding 80% of the land value had to agree
although there was some variation (Blum, 1981; McCloskey, 2015). Due to data limitations, I
also assume land value and acreage are the same. While this is not an inequality measures, it
sheds light on whether a precondition of parliamentary enclosure was high levels of inequality.
There are a number of shortcomings with the data. First, the data only includes acreage
instead of the land values which would be ideal. This results in some measurement error as
land values will be correlated with acreages but not perfectly. To partially address this, I
will measure inequality within parishes, a small geographical unit, where many of the envi-
ronmental aspects of land quality, such as soil type and weather, should be similar. However,
some of the data was aggregated at the region level which does not allow dis-aggregation
into parish level data. These two regions were Buckinghamshire and Warwickshire. As there
is no way of correcting for this, I report the inequality measures at the region level.
Second, the data is from secondary sources where the acreages awarded to each individual
was tabulated by bins of acreages. This means I can only measure inequality across acreage
bins but I will have to assume inequality within an acreage bin does not exist. Specifically,
I do this by assigning the mid-point value to every member of each bin. In the cases that
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Figure 2: Comparison of Gini Measures with/without the Landless
total acreages are known for each bin, I will assign the average acreage per person to each
individual. While this is a limitation, it is common to many historical inequality estimates
such as that by social table (Milanovic et al., 2010). The resulting inequality estimates can
be interpreted as a downwardly biased estimate.
Third, I do not observe landless individuals within a community. This can lead to a large
miss-measurement in wealth inequality within the community as a whole. For instance, for
Gamston in Nottinghamshire, there were only two people awarded lands, both of whom
were in the top bin of landholdings. In this case, due to my assumption of within-bin
equality, there appears to be perfect equality. However, this may be one of the most unequal
communities if most people were landless.
To account for this issue, I use data on parish populations and the share of adult males to
estimate the total number of households.2 As the whole parish was not necessarily enclosed
simultaneously, I assume the enclosed share of the parish acreage was used by the same share
of households. I also show that variations of this approach produce similar results. Through
this exercise, I can estimate inequality inclusive of the landless.
The importance of this correction can be confirmed in figure 2 where I plot gini coefficients
2When the data is not available for the exact year, I assume the parish had similar population growth
rates as for Britain as a whole using figures from Broadberry et al. (2015). I then multiply the adult male
to population ratio in 1831 to the estimated population of the parish in that year.
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Table 1: Inequality Among the Landed
Region County Period Awards Gini Required Population
for Enclosure
Number Share
South East Buckinghamshire+ 1760-1819 81 0.76
Warwickshire+ 1720-1822 125 0.72
East Midlands Leicestershire 1757-1772 9 0.55 11.22 0.40
Nottinghamshire 1759-1868 130 0.63 8.72 0.33
Northwest Cumbria 1805-1820 6 0.60 19.00 0.35
Westmorland 1772-1822 8 0.49 10.75 0.45
Yorkshire 1725-1858 151 0.60 6.74 0.38
+ indicates regions for which estimation is done at the county aggregate level.
Sources: Brown (1995), Crowther (1983), Martin (1967), Searle (1993), Turner (1980), Whyte (2006), Yelling
(1977)
that include/exclude the landless. There are many parishes where there appears to have been
no landless household resulting in a 45 degree line. In general, the two measures of inequality
are highly correlated. However, among the parishes where the gini excluding the landless
are below 0.25, the gini including the landless is significantly higher. In particular, those
parishes with perfect equality without the landless turn out to be among the most unequal
parishes confirming the initial concerns.
Results
Table 1 shows the inequality estimates among the landed by region in the enclosed
parishes. The Gini coefficients range from 0.5-0.8 showing a large amount of variation. How-
ever, some caution is required as the south east region calculates inequality at the county
level due to data limitations as explain earlier. When I calculate the gini for Nottinghamshire
and Yorkshire at the aggregate regional level, I find the gini are higher at 0.72 and 0.80 re-
spectively. This is due to aggregate level estimates also accounting for inequality across
villages. Therefore, the gini for the south east are over-estimated and actual inequality was
probably closer to 0.6 like most other regions. The only exception is Westmorland where
inequality appears lower.
Another interesting finding is that 33-45% of the population would have been required
to agree for a parliamentary enclosure to occur. This is evidence that a small minority
could initiate enclosure against the will of the vast majority of rights holders. It also shows
this level of inequality among rights holders was likely a precondition for the initiation of
parliamentary enclosure.
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Table 2: Inequality including Landless
Region County Period Awards Gini Proportion
Landless
Panel A: All Matched
East Midlands Leicestershire 1757-1772 9 0.78 0.48
Nottinghamshire 1759-1868 104 0.82 0.46
Northwest Cumbria 1805-1820 6 0.65 0.13
Westmorland 1772-1822 5 0.70 0.42
Yorkshire 1725-1852 105 0.78 0.40
Panel B: Cases with more than 80% of the parish enclosed
East Midlands Leicestershire 1765 20 0.84 0.52
Nottinghamshire 1760-1810 29 0.84 0.54
Northwest Yorkshire 1754-1836 33 0.87 0.58
Panel C: Cases with 100% of the parish enclosed
East Midlands Nottinghamshire 1767-1796 5 0.88 0.56
Northwest Yorkshire 1754-1836 8 0.82 0.46
Sources: Brown (1995), Crowther (1983), Searle (1993), Whyte (2006), Yelling (1977)
For a subset of parishes which could be matched to population statistics, I can account
for the landless as shown in figure 2. Panel A shows the results for all parishes, regardless
of the share of the parish that was enclosed. I find that gini coefficients are significantly
higher, by approximately 0.2 gini points, due to 40-50% of households being landless in most
cases. Most gini coefficients now range from 0.7-0.8. The exception is Cumbria and this
matches the findings from Shaw-Taylor (2012) whereby this region had more family farming.
Compared to the study by Lindert (1987) for England and Wales in 1873, which estimated
the share landless as 85% of the population, my findings are lower. However, this was for
England and Wales as a whole ignoring land rights within commons. Unsurprisingly, the
commons were equal relative to enclosed lands.
One concern is that Panel A includes parishes where small shares of the total area was
enclosed. Could inequality have generally been lower in the rest of the parish? I address
this concern by looking at parishes where more than 80% of the land was enclosed (Panel B)
and where the entire parish was enclosed (Panel C). In both cases, I further limit the sample
to parishes that did not have a future enclosure. Although the sample size is smaller, the
results suggest such parishes were even more unequal and miss-measurement of the landless
does not seem to be driving my results. Despite commons often being regarded as bastions
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Table 3: Trends in Inequality of Enclosed Parishes
Gini Gini including Landless
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Nottinghamshire Yorkshire All Nottinghamshire Yorkshire
Year -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Region FE Yes No No Yes No No
Obs 304 130 151 229 104 105
Adj-R2 0.027 -0.008 0.036 0.030 -0.007 -0.008
Sources: Brown (1995), Crowther (1983), Searle (1993), Whyte (2006), Yelling (1977)
of equality, in reality they were highly unequal by the 18th century.
One final exercise is to look at time variation in parishes that got enclosed across time.
As I am not observing the same parish across time, this says little about time trends in land
inequality. However, it may be informative about whether the threshold for parliamentary
enclosure was changing. I regress the gini coefficient on a time trend with region fixed effects
and show the results in table 3 (and graphs are available in appendix A).3 I find there is
a marginally significant negative trend in general and much of the negative trend comes
from Yorkshire. In contrast, Nottinghamshire has no observable trend in gini coefficient of
parishes that got enclosed. This provides some suggestive evidence that more equal areas
were also getting enclosed in the later periods of parliamentary enclosure.
Discussion
How do my findings compare to that from other times and places? Within England,
wealth inequality was clearly high by 1900. Estimates of wealth inequality in the UK suggest
the top 10% held an astonishing 96.1% of wealth by 1900 (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Such high
wealth inequality only dropped after the first world war to the 1980s, although the degree
of the drop is debated (Cummins, 2019). My findings of high inequality over land rights
within the most equal areas of England in the 18th-19th centuries are consistent with the
later trends in wealth inequality.
What about the period preceding the 18th century? Inequality over land rights can
also be estimated in England prior to the black death using data from the hundred rolls,
1279-80. The hundred rolls, also known as the second domesday book, was a survey of
landholdings across the country that was never completed. Similarly to common rights,
3I regress Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire separately due to the larger sample size.
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landholding rights yielded incomes to peasants and are a measure of wealth inequality in
medieval rural England. The data on the acreages held by each peasant for Cambridgeshire,
Huntingdonshire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire (in the midlands and the East of England)
were collected and tabulated by Kanzaka (2002). I can therefore use a similar method
as above to estimate wealth inequality, after accounting for the rent paid to the lord and
differentials between free and unfree peasants (for details see appendix A). However, a similar
issue is that 1) the land is in acreage rather than value and 2) the landless are missing from
the survey. Regarding the first issue, it is not possible to disaggregate the data into smaller
geographical units. However, it is likely to upwardly bias inequality relative to the parish
level as shown above. For the second issue, I assume the landless made up 47% of the rural
population, as estimated by Campbell (2008) for the whole of England and Wales.
When I ignore the landless, the gini coefficient for landholdings was approximately 0.59.4
If we compare this to the earlier findings for Buckinghamshire and Warwichshire, which were
also aggregated, it suggests inequality was slightly lower. Once I assume the landless were
47% of the population, the gini coefficient increases to 0.78.5 These estimates suggest in-
equality was lower in medieval England once we adjust for the aggregation bias. Further, the
19th century estimates are from the most equal areas in England. Therefore, medieval Eng-
land was highly unequal but slightly more equal than 19th century England. One interesting
implication of these findings is that high inequality and high levels of landless households
was not limited to the period preceding the industrial revolution. This also seems to have
occurred in medieval England.
It is also possible to compare the findings from rural English parishes to comparable
data from pre-industrial Germany, Italy, and Japan. The data for rural Germany and Italy
are from tax records and measure the inequality in the value of real estate (Alfani, 2015;
Alfani and Di Tullio, 2019; Alfani et al., 2020). The comparability issue is that 1) they
include housing 2) they do not include the landless. Regarding the first issue, housing was
generally more equally distributed than lands (Nicolini and Ramos Palencia, 2016) so the
bias is downward. For the second issue, there seems to have been few people with no property
but there may be a small downward bias. Therefore, the levels are generally underestimated.
The data for Japan is only for land, measured in value, and is therefore more comparable to
the data from England (Kumon, 2019).
I find inequality in the commons of England seem to generally be in line with Italy but
more unequal than Germany and Japan. However, the English commons were more unequal
4This calculation uses tabulated data, categorized by landholding class. I assume the lack of inequality
within category making this a downward biased estimate.
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Figure 3: International Comparisons of Village Level Wealth Inequality
Sources: Alfani (2015), Bengtsson et al. (2018), Alfani and Di Tullio (2019) , Kumon (2019), Alfani et al.
(2020)
than the rest of the country. Although we cannot be precise in our comparisons, due to
differences in the data, it seems clear that England was among those countries with high
pre-industrial rural inequality. This matches the general narrative for the rise of landless
laborers (or proletariats) in England while similar narratives do not pre-dominate for other
societies such as Japan or Germany.
Unfortunately, it is unclear if there was an upward trend in wealth inequality. This
occurred in Italy and Germany with the exception of catastrophic shocks that temporary
bought down inequality (Alfani, 2015; Alfani and Di Tullio, 2019; Alfani et al., 2020). How-
ever, the findings from England suggest that high inequality preceded the black death, much
like Italy and Germany. Therefore, it is in line with the narrative that societies generally
converge towards high inequality (Scheidel, 2017).
Conclusion
This paper showed that the commons themselves had unequal distributions of land rights
as they were getting enclosed in the 18th-19th century. Gini coefficients ranged from 0.65-
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0.82 within English regions. Further, 40-50% of the population did not own land in most of
these parishes. The high level of inequality may have also enabled parliamentary enclosure
to pass via an 80% majority by value of land rogjts. Only 33-45% of the population in
these parishes would have been required to pass the act meaning the opposition of the large
majority of people could not block parliamentary enclosure.
Despite these areas being the most equal within England, they were on average far more
unequal than typical villages in contemporary Japan or Germany and had more similar land
distributions to Italy. As England as a whole must have been more unequal than these
commons, this implies that England was more unequal than these societies.
It remains unknown why rural wealth inequality in England was exceptionally high by
1750. Also, what were the dynamics in wealth inequality? Was it increasing like in much of
the rest of Western Europe (Alfani, 2015; Alfani and Ryckbosch, 2016; Alfani and Amman-
nati, 2017; Scheidel, 2017; Alfani and Di Tullio, 2019; Alfani et al., 2020)? Further, are there
any link between the relatively high inequality of England and its high wages or its earlier
industrialization? These are questions that remain for future research.
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Figure A1: Inequality Levels Across Time
Inequality in Medieval England
Medieval English peasants were split into free and unfree peasants at this time. The
difference was that unfree peasants had labor obligations for the lord in addition to higher
rents, no access to courts, and other taxations such as the heriot, a death-duty. Therefore,
free peasants received more income from holding land than unfree peasants, resulting in one
type of inequality. Kanzaka (2002) lists the rent paid by each of these types of laborers, in
1
addition to the shares of each type by landholding class. Unfortunately there is no estimate
of land income for each type of peasant.
Therefore, I estimate this by estimating total land’s share of income and subtract the
rents of each type of laborer. I take land’s share of income as 40% of yields and labor’s share
as 50% of yield taken from table 14 of Allen (2006).
Land Income net of rent = days of work×wage× 0.4
0.5
−land rent per acre×acres worked
I assume a laborer worked 250 days. Using average wages (1277-1282) from Clark (2007),
the total wage income is 432.5 pence. This brings land’s share of income, the first component
on the right hand side, to 346 pence. If a farmer owned and cultivated 30 acres over one
year with 250 days of work (the standard virgate in this region), the land income net of rents
for the peasant is 133 pence for unfree peasants and 214 pence for free peasants. This is
4.4 pence per acre for unfree peasants and 7.1 pence per acre for free peasants. Thus, free
peasants are assumed to earn 1.6 times more rent per acre.
I then estimate the implied Gini coefficient assuming differences in land incomes net of
taxation by peasant class. The resulting Gini range between 0.7-0.8 depending on assump-
tions of the share of unrecorded landless ranging from 30% to 50%.
2
